Computer Science - Computer Science and Game Theory Publications (50)


Computer Science - Computer Science and Game Theory Publications

We introduce a combinatorial variant of the cost sharing problem: several services can be provided to each player and each player values every combination of services differently. A publicly known cost function specifies the cost of providing every possible combination of services. A combinatorial cost sharing mechanism is a protocol that decides which services each player gets and at what price. Read More

In many smart infrastructure applications flexibility in achieving sustainability goals can be gained by engaging end-users. However, these users often have heterogeneous preferences that are unknown to the decision-maker tasked with improving operational efficiency. Modeling user interaction as a continuous game between non-cooperative players, we propose a robust parametric utility learning framework that employs constrained feasible generalized least squares estimation with heteroskedastic inference. Read More

We study a class of procurement auctions, where an auctioneer is interested in buying resources or services from a set of agents. The auctioneer is interested in selecting a subset of agents so as to maximize her valuation function, without exceeding a given budget. As the resources are owned by strategic agents, our overall goal is to design mechanisms that are i) truthful, ii) budget-feasible, and iii) obtain a good approximation to the optimal value. Read More

Recent initiatives by regulatory agencies to increase spectrum resources available for broadband access include rules for sharing spectrum with high-priority incumbents. We study a model in which wireless Service Providers (SPs) charge for access to their own exclusive-use (licensed) band along with access to an additional shared band. The total, or delivered price in each band is the announced price plus a congestion cost, which depends on the load, or total users normalized by the bandwidth. Read More

Many hardness results in computational social choice make use of the fact that every directed graph may be induced as the pairwise majority relation of some preference profile. However, this fact requires a number of voters that is almost linear in the number of alternatives. It is therefore unclear whether these results remain intact when the number of voters is bounded, as is, for example, typically the case in search engine aggregation settings. Read More

Level-1 consensus is a property of a preference profile. Intuitively, it means that there exists some preference relation such that, when ordering the other preference-relations by increasing distance from it, the closer preferences are more frequent in the profile. This is a desirable property, since it enhances the stability of the social choice by guaranteeing that there exists a Condorcet winner and it is elected by all scoring rules. Read More

We consider strategic arrivals to a FCFS service system that starts service at a fixed time and has to serve a fixed number of customers, e.g., an airplane boarding system. Read More

We introduce perfect half space games, in which the goal of Player 2 is to make the sums of encountered multi-dimensional weights diverge in a direction which is consistent with a chosen sequence of perfect half spaces (chosen dynamically by Player 2). We establish that the bounding games of Jurdzi\'nski et al. (ICALP 2015) can be reduced to perfect half space games, which in turn can be translated to the lexicographic energy games of Colcombet and Niwi\'nski, and are positionally determined in a strong sense (Player 2 can play without knowing the current perfect half space). Read More

We study online resource allocation in a cloud computing platform, through a posted pricing mechanism: The cloud provider publishes a unit price for each resource type, which may vary over time; upon arrival at the cloud system, a cloud user either takes the current prices, renting resources to execute its job, or refuses the prices without running its job there. We design pricing functions based on the current resource utilization ratios, in a wide array of demand-supply relationships and resource occupation durations, and prove worst-case competitive ratios of the pricing functions in terms of social welfare. In the basic case of a single-type, non-recycled resource (i. Read More

We propose a new model for formalizing reward collection problems on graphs with dynamically generated rewards which may appear and disappear based on a stochastic model. The robot routing problem is modeled as a graph whose nodes are stochastic processes generating potential rewards over discrete time. The rewards are generated according to the stochastic process, but at each step, an existing reward may disappear with a given probability. Read More

Modern decision making tools are based on statistical analysis of abundant data, which is often collected by querying multiple individuals. We consider data collection through crowdsourcing, where independent and self-interested agents, non-experts, report measurements, such as sensor readings, opinions, such as product reviews, or answers to human intelligence tasks. Since the accuracy of information is positively correlated with the effort invested in obtaining it, self-interested agents tend to report low-quality data. Read More

In the multi-unit pricing problem, multiple units of a single item are for sale. A buyer's valuation for $n$ units of the item is $v \min \{ n, d\} $, where the per unit valuation $v$ and the capacity $d$ are private information of the buyer. We consider this problem in the Bayesian setting, where the pair $(v,d)$ is drawn jointly from a given probability distribution. Read More

We study 2-player turn-based perfect-information stochastic games with countably infinite state space. The players aim at maximizing/minimizing the probability of a given event (i.e. Read More

While every instance of the Hospitals/Residents problem admits a stable matching, the problem with lower quotas (HR-LQ) has instances with no stable matching. For such an instance, we expect the existence of an envy-free matching, which is a relaxation of a stable matching preserving a kind of fairness property. In this paper, we investigate the existence of an envy-free matching in several settings, in which hospitals have lower quotas and not all doctor-hospital pairs are acceptable. Read More

Cluster structure in cognitive radio networks facilitates cooperative spectrum sensing, routing and other functionalities. The unlicensed channels, which are available for every member of a group of cognitive radio users, consolidate the group into a cluster, and the availability of unlicensed channels decides the robustness of that cluster against the licensed users' influence. This paper analyses the problem that how to form robust clusters in cognitive radio network, so that more cognitive radio users can get benefits from cluster structure even when the primary users' operation are intense. Read More

Human societies around the world interact with each other by developing and maintaining social norms, and it is critically important to understand how such norms emerge and change. In this work, we define an evolutionary game-theoretic model to study how norms change in a society, based on the idea that different strength of norms in societies translate to different game-theoretic interaction structures and incentives. We use this model to study, both analytically and with extensive agent-based simulations, the evolutionary relationships of the need for coordination in a society (which is related to its norm strength) with two key aspects of norm change: cultural inertia (whether or how quickly the population responds when faced with conditions that make a norm change desirable), and exploration rate (the willingness of agents to try out new strategies). Read More

We consider a track selection problem for multi-target tracking in a multifunction radar network from a game-theoretic perspective. The problem is formulated as a non-cooperative game. The radars are considered to be players in this game with utilities modeled using a proper tracking accuracy criterion and their strategies are the observed targets whose number is known. Read More

Imitation is widely observed in populations of decision-making agents. Using our recent convergence results for asynchronous imitation dynamics on networks, we consider how such networks can be efficiently driven to a desired equilibrium state by offering payoff incentives for using a certain strategy, either uniformly or targeted to individuals. In particular, if for each available strategy, agents playing that strategy receive maximum payoff when their neighbors play that same strategy, we show that providing incentives to agents in a network that is at equilibrium will result in convergence to a unique new equilibrium. Read More

Traditionally, Internet Access Providers (APs) only charge end-users for Internet access services; however, to recoup infrastructure costs and increase revenues, some APs have recently adopted two-sided pricing schemes under which both end-users and content providers are charged. Meanwhile, with the rapid growth of traffic, network congestion could seriously degrade user experiences and influence providers' utility. To optimize profit and social welfare, APs and regulators need to design appropriate pricing strategies and regulatory policies that take the effects of network congestion into consideration. Read More

In this paper, a novel framework is proposed for optimizing the operation and performance of a large-scale, multi-hop millimeter wave (mmW) backhaul within a wireless small cell network (SCN) that encompasses multiple mobile network operators (MNOs). The proposed framework enables the small base stations (SBSs) to jointly decide on forming the multi-hop, mmW links over backhaul infrastructure that belongs to multiple, independent MNOs, while properly allocating resources across those links. In this regard, the problem is addressed using a novel framework based on matching theory that is composed to two, highly inter-related stages: a multi-hop network formation stage and a resource management stage. Read More

We consider the following communication problem: Alice and Bob each have some valuation functions $v_1(\cdot)$ and $v_2(\cdot)$ over subsets of $m$ items, and their goal is to partition the items into $S, \bar{S}$ in a way that maximizes the welfare, $v_1(S) + v_2(\bar{S})$. We study both the allocation problem, which asks for a welfare-maximizing partition and the decision problem, which asks whether or not there exists a partition guaranteeing certain welfare, for binary XOS valuations. For interactive protocols with $poly(m)$ communication, a tight 3/4-approximation is known for both [Fei06,DS06]. Read More

Delay Tolerant Networks (DTNs) rely on the cooperation of nodes in a network to forward a message from its source to its destination. Most of previous studies on DTNs have focused on the design of routing schemes under the hypothesis that each relay node is willing to participate in the forwarding process. However, the delivery of a message incurs energy and memory costs. Read More

We present efficient algorithms for computing optimal or approximately optimal strategies in a zero-sum game for which Player I has n pure strategies and Player II has an arbitrary number of pure strategies. We assume that for any given mixed strategy of Player I, a best response or "approximate" best response of Player II can be found by an oracle in time polynomial in n. We then show how our algorithms may be applied to several search games with applications to security and counter-terrorism. Read More

We introduce a new sample complexity measure, which we refer to as split-sample growth rate. For any hypothesis $H$ and for any sample $S$ of size $m$, the split-sample growth rate $\hat{\tau}_H(m)$ counts how many different hypotheses can empirical risk minimization output on any sub-sample of $S$ of size $m/2$. We show that the expected generalization error is upper bounded by $O\left(\sqrt{\frac{\log(\hat{\tau}_H(2m))}{m}}\right)$. Read More

This paper contains an axiomatic study of consistent approval-based multi-winner rules, i.e., voting rules that select a fixed-size group of candidates based on approval ballots. Read More

We have introduced evolutionary game dynamics to a one-dimensional cellular-automaton to investigate evolution and maintenance of cooperative avoiding behavior of self-driven particles in bidirectional flow. In our model, there are two kinds of particles, which are right-going particles and left-going particles. They often face opponent particles, so that they swerve to the right or left stochastically in order to avoid conflicts. Read More

We consider "time-of-use" pricing as a technique for matching supply and demand of temporal resources with the goal of maximizing social welfare. Relevant examples include energy, computing resources on a cloud computing platform, and charging stations for electric vehicles, among many others. A client/job in this setting has a window of time during which he needs service, and a particular value for obtaining it. Read More

We consider MultiCriteria Decision Analysis models which are defined over discrete attributes, taking a finite number of values. We do not assume that the model is monotonically increasing with respect to the attributes values. Our aim is to define an importance index for such general models, considering that they are equivalent to $k$-ary games (multichoice games). Read More

We study Proportional Approval Voting (PAV)---an election system used for choosing representatives bodies, such as parliaments, based on preferences of a population of voters over individual candidates. We observe that the problem of computing the outcome of PAV can be cast as a variant of the standard k-median problem. Our main result is that, due to the specific (harmonic) cost structure, the problem allows constant factor approximation that does not require the underlying connection costs to be metric. Read More

If the influence diagram (ID) depicting a Bayesian game is common knowledge to its players then additional assumptions may allow the players to make use of its embodied irrelevance statements. They can then use these to discover a simpler game which still embodies both their optimal decision policies. However the impact of this result has been rather limited because many common Bayesian games do not exhibit sufficient symmetry to be fully and efficiently represented by an ID. Read More

In a seminal paper, Chen, Roughgarden and Valiant studied cost sharing protocols for network design with the objective to implement a low-cost Steiner forest as a Nash equilibrium of an induced cost-sharing game. One of the most intriguing open problems up to date is to understand the power of budget-balanced and separable cost sharing protocols in order to induce low-cost Steiner forests. In this work, we focus on undirected networks and analyze topological properties of the underlying graph so that an optimal Steiner forest can be implemented as a Nash equilibrium (by some separable cost sharing protocol) independent of the edge costs. Read More

A big data service is any data-originated resource that is offered over the Internet. The performance of a big data service depends on the data bought from the data collectors. However, the problem of optimal pricing and data allocation in big data services is not well-studied. Read More

In this paper, we introduce a preliminary model for interactions in the data market. Recent research has shown ways in which a data aggregator can design mechanisms for users to ensure the quality of data, even in situations where the users are effort-averse (i.e. Read More

We show a communication complexity lower bound for finding a correlated equilibrium of a two-player game. More precisely, we define a two-player $N \times N$ game called the 2-cycle game and show that the randomized communication complexity of finding a 1/poly($N$)-approximate correlated equilibrium of the 2-cycle game is $\Omega(N)$. For small approximation values, this answers an open question of Babichenko and Rubinstein (STOC 2017). Read More

The online feasibility problem (for a set of sporadic tasks) asks whether there is a scheduler that always prevents deadline misses (if any), whatever the sequence of job releases, which is a priori} unknown to the scheduler. In the multiprocessor setting, this problem is notoriously difficult. The only exact test for this problem has been proposed by Bonifaci and Marchetti-Spaccamela: it consists in modelling all the possible behaviours of the scheduler and of the tasks as a graph; and to interpret this graph as a game between the tasks and the scheduler, which are seen as antagonistic players. Read More

We introduce quantitative reductions, a novel technique for solving quantitative games that does not rely on a reduction to qualitative games. We demonstrate that such reductions exhibit the same desirable properties as qualitative ones. In addition, they retain the optimality of solutions. Read More

Due to increasing concerns about privacy and data control as one of the factors, many small clouds (SCs) established by different providers are emerging in an attempt to meet demand locally. The flip-side of this approach is the problem of resource inelasticity faced by the SCs due to their relatively scarce resources (e.g. Read More

Proper scoring rules elicit truth-telling when making predictions, or otherwise revealing information. However, when multiple predictions are made of the same event, telling the truth is in general no longer optimal, as agents are motivated to distort early predictions to mislead competitors. We demonstrate this, and then prove a significant exception: In a multi-agent prediction setting where all agent signals belong to a jointly multivariate normal distribution, and signal variances are common knowledge, the (proper) logarithmic scoring rule will elicit truthful predictions from every agent at every prediction, regardless of the number, order and timing of predictions. Read More

We identify a whole family of approval-based multi-winner voting rules that satisfy PJR. Moreover, we identify a subfamily of voting rules within this family that satisfy EJR. All these voting rules can be computed in polynomial time as long as the subalgorithms that characterize each rule within the family are polynomial. Read More

Game Theory (GT) has been used with excellent results to model and optimize the operation of a huge number of real-world systems, including in communications and networking. Using a tutorial style, this paper surveys and updates the literature contributions that have applied a diverse set of theoretical games to solve a variety of challenging problems, namely in wireless data communication networks. During our literature discussion, the games are initially divided into three groups: classical, evolutionary, and incomplete information. Read More

In this short note, we describe an approval-based committee selection rule that admits a polynomial-time algorithm and satisfies the Extended Justified Representation (EJR) axiom. This rule is based on approximately maximizing the PAV score, by means of local search. Our proof strategy is to show that this rule provides almost optimal average satisfaction to all cohesive groups of voters, and that high average satisfaction for cohesive groups implies extended justified representation. Read More

There is a heterogeneous resource that contains both good parts and bad parts, for example, a cake with some parts burnt, or a land-estate with some parts polluted. The resource has to be divided fairly among n agents, each of whom has a personal value-density function on the resource. The value-density functions can accept any real value - positive or negative. Read More

We study the problem of fair allocation for indivisible goods. We use the the maxmin share paradigm introduced by Budish as a measure for fairness. Procacciafirst (EC'14) were first to investigate this fundamental problem in the additive setting. Read More

We study the random multi-unit assignment problem in which the number of goods to be distributed depends on players' preferences, obtaining several results that also apply to its corresponding version with fixed number of goods, commonly referred to as the course allocation problem. Although efficiency, envy-freeness, and group strategy-proofness can be achieved in the domain of dichotomous preferences, two standard results disappear: the egalitarian solution cannot be supported by competitive prices, so the competitive solution can no longer be computed with the Eisenberg-Gale program maximizing the Nash product, and the competitive allocation with equal incomes is no longer unique. The egalitarian solution is more appealing than the competitive one in this setup because it is Lorenz dominant, unique, and impossible to manipulate by groups. Read More

Market equilibria of matching markets offer an intuitive and fair solution for matching problems without money with agents who have preferences over the items. Such a matching market can be viewed as a variation of Fisher market, albeit with rather peculiar preferences of agents. These preferences can be described by piece-wise linear concave (PLC) functions, which however, are not separable (due to each agent only asking for one item), are not monotone, and do not satisfy the gross substitute property-- increase in price of an item can result in increased demand for the item. Read More

We study the problem of a budget limited buyer who wants to buy a set of items, each from a different seller, to maximize her value. The budget feasible mechanism design problem aims to design a mechanism which incentivizes the sellers to truthfully report their cost, and maximizes the buyer's value while guaranteeing that the total payment does not exceed her budget. Such budget feasible mechanisms can model a buyer in a crowdsourcing market interested in recruiting a set of workers (sellers) to accomplish a task for her. Read More

In this paper, we study behavior of bidders in an experimental launch of a new advertising auction platform by Zillow, as Zillow switched from negotiated contracts to using auctions in several geographically isolated markets. A unique feature of this experiment is that the bidders in this market are real estate agents that bid on their own behalf, not using third-party intermediaries. To help bidders, Zillow also provided a recommendation tool that suggested a bid for each bidder. Read More

We study variants of the stable marriage and college admissions models in which the agents are allowed to express weak preferences over the set of agents on the other side of the market and the option of remaining unmatched. For the problems that we address, previous authors have presented polynomial-time algorithms for computing a "Pareto-stable" matching. In the case of college admissions, these algorithms require the preferences of the colleges over groups of students to satisfy a technical condition related to responsiveness. Read More

We consider a committee voting setting in which each voter approves of a subset of candidates and based on the approvals, a target number of candidates are to be selected. In particular we focus on the axiomatic property called extended justified representation (EJR). Although a committee satisfying EJR is guaranteed to exist, the computational complexity of finding such a committee has been an open problem and explicitly mentioned in multiple recent papers. Read More

In approval voting, individuals vote for all platforms that they find acceptable. In this situation it is natural to ask: When is agreement possible? What conditions guarantee that some fraction of the voters agree on even a single platform? Berg et. al. Read More