# Palash Dey

## Contact Details

NamePalash Dey |
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## Pubs By Year |
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## Pub CategoriesComputer Science - Multiagent Systems (14) Computer Science - Artificial Intelligence (12) Computer Science - Data Structures and Algorithms (12) Computer Science - Computer Science and Game Theory (8) Computer Science - Computational Complexity (4) Computer Science - Computers and Society (2) Computer Science - Discrete Mathematics (2) Computer Science - Databases (1) |

## Publications Authored By Palash Dey

This thesis is in the area called computational social choice which is an intersection area of algorithms and social choice theory. Read More

We consider elections where the voters come one at a time, in a streaming fashion, and devise space-efficient algorithms which identify an approximate winning committee with respect to common multiwinner proportional representation voting rules; specifically, we consider the Approval-based and the Borda-based variants of both the Chamberlin-- ourant rule and the Monroe rule. We complement our algorithms with lower bounds. Somewhat surprisingly, our results imply that, using space which does not depend on the number of voters it is possible to efficiently identify an approximate representative committee of fixed size over vote streams with huge number of voters. Read More

A directed graph where there is exactly one edge between every pair of vertices is called a {\em tournament}. Finding the "best" set of vertices of a tournament is a well studied problem in social choice theory. A {\em tournament solution} takes a tournament as input and outputs a subset of vertices of the input tournament. Read More

The domain of single crossing preference profiles is a widely studied domain in social choice theory. It has been generalized to the domain of single crossing preference profiles with respect to trees which inherits many desirable properties from the single crossing domain, for example, transitivity of majority relation, existence of polynomial time algorithms for finding winners of Kemeny voting rule, etc. In this paper, we consider a further generalization of the domain of single crossing profiles on trees to the domain consisting of all preference profiles which can be extended to single crossing preference profiles with respect to some tree by adding more preferences to it. Read More

We consider election scenarios with incomplete information, a situation that arises often in practice. There are several models of incomplete information and accordingly, different notions of outcomes of such elections. In one well-studied model of incompleteness, the votes are given by partial orders over the candidates. Read More

The Coalitional Manipulation problem has been studied extensively in the literature for many voting rules. However, most studies have focused on the complete information setting, wherein the manipulators know the votes of the non-manipulators. While this assumption is reasonable for purposes of showing intractability, it is unrealistic for algorithmic considerations. Read More

In multiagent systems, we often have a set of agents each of which have a preference ordering over a set of items and one would like to know these preference orderings for various tasks, for example, data analysis, preference aggregation, voting etc. However, we often have a large number of items which makes it impractical to ask the agents for their complete preference ordering. In such scenarios, we usually elicit these agents' preferences by asking (a hopefully small number of) comparison queries --- asking an agent to compare two items. Read More

Eliciting the preferences of a set of agents over a set of alternatives is a problem of fundamental importance in social choice theory. Prior work on this problem has studied the query complexity of preference elicitation for the unrestricted domain and for the domain of single peaked preferences. In this paper, we consider the domain of single crossing preference profiles and study the query complexity of preference elicitation under various settings. Read More

We give the first optimal bounds for returning the $\ell_1$-heavy hitters in a data stream of insertions, together with their approximate frequencies, closing a long line of work on this problem. For a stream of $m$ items in $\{1, 2, \dots, n\}$ and parameters $0 < \epsilon < \phi \leq 1$, let $f_i$ denote the frequency of item $i$, i.e. Read More

We study the computational complexity of committee selection problem for several approval-based voting rules in the presence of outliers. Our first result shows that outlier consideration makes committee selection problem intractable for approval, net approval, and minisum approval voting rules. We then study parameterized complexity of this problem with five natural parameters, namely the target score, the size of the committee (and its dual parameter, the number of candidates outside the committee), the number of outliers (and its dual parameter, the number of non-outliers). Read More

We investigate the problem of winner determination from computational social choice theory in the data stream model. Specifically, we consider the task of summarizing an arbitrarily ordered stream of $n$ votes on $m$ candidates into a small space data structure so as to be able to obtain the winner determined by popular voting rules. As we show, finding the exact winner requires storing essentially all the votes. Read More

The margin of victory of an election is a useful measure to capture the robustness of an election outcome. It also plays a crucial role in determining the sample size of various algorithms in post election audit, polling etc. In this work, we present efficient sampling based algorithms for estimating the margin of victory of elections. Read More

Bribery in elections is an important problem in computational social choice theory. However, bribery with money is often illegal in elections. Motivated by this, we introduce the notion of frugal bribery and formulate two new pertinent computational problems which we call Frugal-bribery and Frugal- $bribery to capture bribery without money in elections. Read More

The Coalitional Manipulation (CM) problem has been studied extensively in the literature for many voting rules. The CM problem, however, has been studied only in the complete information setting, that is, when the manipulators know the votes of the non-manipulators. A more realistic scenario is an incomplete information setting where the manipulators do not know the exact votes of the non- manipulators but may have some partial knowledge of the votes. Read More

Predicting the winner of an election is a favorite problem both for news media pundits and computational social choice theorists. Since it is often infeasible to elicit the preferences of all the voters in a typical prediction scenario, a common algorithm used for winner prediction is to run the election on a small sample of randomly chosen votes and output the winner as the prediction. We analyze the performance of this algorithm for many common voting rules. Read More

In the Possible Winner problem in computational social choice theory, we are given a set of partial preferences and the question is whether a distinguished candidate could be made winner by extending the partial preferences to linear preferences. Previous work has provided, for many common voting rules, fixed parameter tractable algorithms for the Possible Winner problem, with number of candidates as the parameter. However, the corresponding kernelization question is still open and in fact, has been mentioned as a key research challenge. Read More

Manipulation is a problem of fundamental importance in the context of voting in which the voters exercise their votes strategically instead of voting honestly to prevent selection of an alternative that is less preferred. The Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem shows that there is no strategy-proof voting rule that simultaneously satisfies certain combinations of desirable properties. Researchers have attempted to get around the impossibility results in several ways such as domain restriction and computational hardness of manipulation. Read More

Classical results in voting theory show that strategic manipulation by voters is inevitable if a voting rule simultaneously satisfy certain desirable properties. Motivated by this, we study the relevant question of how often a voting rule is manipulable. It is well known that elections with a large number of voters are rarely manipulable under impartial culture (IC) assumption. Read More