Flavio Chierichetti

Flavio Chierichetti
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Flavio Chierichetti
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Computer Science - Data Structures and Algorithms (3)
 
Computer Science - Computer Science and Game Theory (2)
 
Mathematics - Probability (1)
 
Physics - Physics and Society (1)
 
Computer Science - Discrete Mathematics (1)

Publications Authored By Flavio Chierichetti

We consider the problem of approximating a given matrix by a low-rank matrix so as to minimize the entrywise $\ell_p$-approximation error, for any $p \geq 1$; the case $p = 2$ is the classical SVD problem. We obtain the first provably good approximation algorithms for this version of low-rank approximation that work for every value of $p \geq 1$, including $p = \infty$. Our algorithms are simple, easy to implement, work well in practice, and illustrate interesting tradeoffs between the approximation quality, the running time, and the rank of the approximating matrix. Read More

The network inference problem consists of reconstructing the edge set of a network given traces representing the chronology of infection times as epidemics spread through the network. This problem is a paradigmatic representative of prediction tasks in machine learning that require deducing a latent structure from observed patterns of activity in a network, which often require an unrealistically large number of resources (e.g. Read More

An active line of research has considered games played on networks in which payoffs depend on both a player's individual decision and also the decisions of her neighbors. Such games have been used to model issues including the formation of opinions and the adoption of technology. A basic question that has remained largely open in this area is to consider games where the strategies available to the players come from a fixed, discrete set, and where players may have different intrinsic preferences among the possible strategies. Read More

The traditional axiomatic approach to voting is motivated by the problem of reconciling differences in subjective preferences. In contrast, a dominant line of work in the theory of voting over the past 15 years has considered a different kind of scenario, also fundamental to voting, in which there is a genuinely "best" outcome that voters would agree on if they only had enough information. This type of scenario has its roots in the classical Condorcet Jury Theorem; it includes cases such as jurors in a criminal trial who all want to reach the correct verdict but disagree in their inferences from the available evidence, or a corporate board of directors who all want to improve the company's revenue, but who have different information that favors different options. Read More